International Social Security Review, vol.54, no.2/3 2001, p.127-137.
A three tier system has been drafted and approved by the government. The first tier will consist of a national pension based on the residence principle, instead of the existing state pension based on the insurance principle. The second tier will be a compulsory funded system based on privately managed pension funds. Several important goals will thus be achieved:
European Industrial Relations Review, no.329, 2001, p.18-20.
A new agreement aimed at overhauling pensions in Spain was signed on 9th April by the government, employer representatives and the trade union confederation CCOO. The deal builds on reforms agreed in 1996 and attempts to encourage people to work beyond 65, to discourage early retirement and to provide incentives for private pensions, which are still in their infancy.
International Social Security Review, vol.54, no.2/3 2001, p.151-175.
It is proposed to create a three-tier pension system in Belarus. The first tier will consist of social pensions, funded out of the national budget, for people who have not provided adequately for their retirement through contributions to the state insurance scheme. The second tier will comprise pensions financed on a pay-as-you-go basis from current contributions to the state insurance scheme. The third level will consist of supplementary pensions paid by occupational or sectoral schemes run on accumulation principles.
International Social Security Review, vol.54, no.2/3, 2001, p.57-79.
Article compares pension reform in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and examines the circumstances which favoured radical change in Poland and Hungary, and held it back in the Czech Republic. The financial situation of the public pay-as-you-go scheme influences the perceived urgency of reform and determines whether the Finance Ministry, with its bias towards privatisation, enters the arena. The degree of the country's external debt determines whether the World Bank gets involved, with its policy advice modelled on the Chilean experience. Radical pension reform becomes feasible when actors favouring privatisation (the Finance Ministry and the World Bank) have greater leverage than the Welfare Ministry, which is likely to favour Bismarkian or Beveridgean paradigms.
D Karasyov and Y Lubin.
International Social Security Review, vol.54, no.2/3, 2001, p.139-149.
The present pension reform programme consists of the following elements: