Welfare Reform on the Web (February 2002): Welfare State - Overseas

MAKING WELFARE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

T. Fitzpatrick

Social Policy and Administration, vol. 52, 2001, p. 506-520

Author attempts to create a new temporal framework for social policy based upon the principles of "sustainable justice". Argues that reconciling the interests of present and future generations of poor people requires the design of a new property regime. An "ecosocial" regime is then defined as being concerned with:

• collective ownership of natural resources;
• private ownership, in the form of an ecosocial dividend;
• sustainability, as steered through green taxes, so that overall capital stock does not decline, and the future inherits a level of well-being at least equal to our own;
• a new political economy which subdues financial globalisation.

REGIMES ON PILLARS: ALTERNATIVE WELFARE STATE LOGICS AND DYNAMICS

R. E. Gooden and M. Rein

Public Administration, vol. 79, 2001, p. 769-801

Describes social welfare provision in terms of "regimes" and "pillars". Regimes describe who receives the benefits and on what conditions; pillars describe who pays for and who provides the benefits. There are historical associations and "natural" affinities between certain regimes and certain pillars, but there is also scope for novel combinations and recombinations in contemporary welfare state reform.

VETO PLAYERS, GLOBALIZATION AND THE REDISTRIBUTIVE CAPACITY OF THE STATE

M.M.L. Crepaz

Journal of Public Policy, vol. 21, 2001, p. 1-22

Globalization is alleged to restrict the state's capacity to fulfil its welfare function in advanced capitalist societies. Paper tests empirically the redistributive capacity of the state operationalized as the difference in the percentage of households living below 50% of the median income in their country before taxes and transfers and after taxes and transfers, based on the latest Luxembourg Income Study data. Results indicate that globalization and collective veto points have consistently positive effects on the redistributive capacity of the state while competitive veto points consistently have a negative effect. Veto points are sets of domestic political institutions.