European Journal of Social Security, vol. 1, 1999, p. 151-180
Article seeks to demonstrate that social security benefits have economic functions over and above providing a replacement income. In Denmark, unemployment insurance functions as a substitute for employment regulation, contributing to high levels of labour mobility and maintaining the collaborative system of industrial relations. In Britain, it reinforces work incentives and allows wages to fall, particularly for younger workers. In Germany, it acts as an instrument for workforce restructuring by circumventing labour law regulation.
M. S. Huber and E. E. Kossek
Community, Work and Family, vol. 2, 1999, p. 173-186
Using a quasi-experimental design, a sample of female welfare clients was followed over 32 months to compare two competing models used to describe welfare dependency. The individual deficit model suggested that clients would not engage in work activities on their own initiative and that legislative sanctions were needed to force them into employment. The ecological/community model suggested that community economic distress, rather than lack of skills, prevented clients from becoming gainfully employed. Results showed that the community in which one lived was a stronger predictor of welfare exits than government programmes mandating individual effort.
E. Bergsma and P. Mullenders
European Journal of Social Security, vol. 1, 1999, p. 203-222
In the Netherlands a market system is being introduced for the delivery of social security. On the basis of a specific case, the provision of reintegration services for the partially disabled, article describes the relationship between purchaser and provider, and draws conclusions about the role of the market in the implementation of social security in the Netherlands.
Critical Social Policy, vol. 19, 1999, p. 353-369
Article gives a critical account of the five arguments used by Norwegian governments to justify their workfare policies. Concludes that none of those arguments give good reasons for denying citizens who do not accept the work or training programme offered by the government the basic means of subsistence.
L. A. Wilson, R. P. Stoker and D. McGrath
Social Science Quarterly, vol. 80, 1999, p. 473-486
Over 200 welfare clients were surveyed about their knowledge of programme requirements and sanctions. The survey results were then compared to their actual records of sanction kept by the welfare agency. Chi-square and logit analyses were then conducted to ascertain whether the sanctioning process improved client knowledge of programme requirements and the status of their personal case. Results showed that most clients did not learn programme requirements even when they experienced sanctions. Rather, most learned to document their lifestyles in response to case worker demands in order to maintain eligibility.